G.L.Piggy [at] gmail.com
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He casually mentions so in a post at AEI.
He’s looking at voter demographics and took for granted that the GOP was imminently doomed due to its location on the bad side of the minority voter bulge. He looks a little deeper and isn’t quite as disturbed:
And yet, when these numbers are plugged into the standard arithmetic for predicting voting outcomes, the expected increase in the Democratic vote in 2016 is not five, six, or seven percentage points. Nor even one or two percentage points. The demographic changes I just described may be expected to produce an increase in the Democratic presidential vote of just three-tenths of one percentage point.
How is that possible? Because I neglected to mention one other set of numbers that goes into that arithmetic, also produced by the Census Bureau in periodic special surveys for the November Current Population survey: Voter turnout. In the presidential elections from 2000 through 2008 (the 2012 figures aren’t yet available), the percentage of Americans eighteen years and older who actually voted averaged 57%. But those percentages varied widely by ethnic group. Among whites, the average turnout was 64%. Among blacks, 57%. Among Latinos and Asians, just 29%.
That’s why the headwind is so feeble in the near term. Between 2012 and 2016, the Census Bureau estimates that the population of voting-age Latinos will increase by 3.9 million people compared to an increase of just 1.8 million whites. But because of their much lower turnout, the expected increase in Latino voters is 9,513 fewer—yes, fewer—than the expected increase in white voters. The only reason that the Democrats can expect even a microscopic 0.3 percentage point increase in the 2016 vote is because of an increase in the black voting-age population.
He thinks the GOP has a few elections left before they face insurmountable headwinds. And, of course, the GOP won’t just remain stagnant.
To be specific, suppose I assume that the overall turnout rate for Latinos and Asians will linearly converge on the African American turnout rate of 57%, reaching that point by 2040. Leaving the other parameters unchanged, the expected Democratic vote for president will rise from 51% in 2012 to 55% in 2024 and to 64% by 2040.
He mentions the marriage gap as well; the trend towards singledom doesn’t bode well for the GOP either. But he points out that higher birthrates among marrieds, who tend to vote conservatively, compounds on the correlation between the voting patterns of parents and children.